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Recent Developments

United States v. Mason:
The Fourth Circuit Clarified the Career Criminal Classification of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
By : Katherine Kiemle

n United States v. Mason,
the Court ofAppeals for the
Fourth Circuit clarified the career
criminal classification ofthe federal
sentencing guidelines. United
States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th
Cir. 2002). The court held a prior
state conviction for unarmed
ro bbery committed when Mason
was a juvenile cannot be counted as
a predicate offense for purposes of
career offender sentencing. Id. at
562.
InApril 2000, JamesAnthony
Mason ("Mason") pleaded guilty to
illegal distribution of cocaine base.
Mason's probation officer, on
whom the court relied for a
sentencing determination, assigned
Mason a total offense level of
twenty-nine, placing him in criminal
history category VI. The probation
officer's recommendation relied
entirely on Section 4B 1.1 of the
federal sentencing guidelines,
which stipulates among other
qualifications that a defendant have
at least two prior felony convictions
of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense. In
Mason's case, the probation
officer's recommendation relied on
a 1990 federal conviction for a
controlled substance committed
when Mason was twenty-six and a
conviction for unarmed robbery

I

committed when Mason was a
juvenile.
Mason was sentenced to 151
months in federal prison and three
years of supervised release as a
result of his category IV criminal
history. Pr;ior to sentencing, Mason
objected to the court's reliance on
the juvenile conviction in determining
career criminal classification. The
district court overruled Mason's
objection. Mason appealed. The
Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de
novo and vacated and remanded
for new sentencing.
In its evaluation, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
dissected Sections 4BI.l and4BI.2
of the federal sentencing guidelines.
Id. at 558. The court began with
Section 4B 1, which sets forth
requirements for the career criminal
offender classification. The issue
with regard to Mason lay with the
third and final element of the
classification, which states a
"defendant has at least two prior
felony convictions of either a crime
of violence or a controlled substance offense." Id. The court
agreed with Mason that the first
felony conviction relied upon by the
court was questionable because,
although convicted as an adult, he
received a juvenile sentence. Id. at
559.

The court, however, did not
find the statute necessarily determinative.ld. For further analysis,
the court reviewed commentary to
Rule 4B 1.2, which defines prior
felony conviction as a prior adult
federal or state conviction. Id. at
559. As such, ajuvenile conviction
cannot be counted in determining
whether a defendant was a career
offender. Id.
The court acknowledged in its
reading of Section 4 B 1.1 that the
appropriate elements of criminal
sentencing have typically been
determined with reference to
Section 4B 1.2. Id. at 559. However, the court found Section
4A 1.2(d) provided potentially
determinative information in this
case. Id. Section 4A1.2(d) deals
with whether offenses committed
prior to age eighteen are included
in the criminal history calculation.
Id. The commentary clarifies that
such offenses are counted only ifthe
adult sentence exceeds one year
and one month. Id. at 560. Therefore, the court reasoned if the
commentary was followed, Mason'sjuvenile robbery conviction
counted for purposes of career
offender classification only ifhe was
both convicted and sentenced as an
adult.ld. at 560.
The court examined whether
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the commentary was inconsistent
with the guidelines and, by relying
on the rule's plain language,
determined it was not. Id. at 560.
The Commission used the word
"imprisonment" in Section 4AI.I
(1), which refers to adult convictions
and sentencing. Id. The Commission then used the word "confinement" in Section 4Al.I (2), which
covers both juvenile and adult
dispositions. Id. The court reasoned the Commission was deliberate in its wording of the rule. Id.
The Commission used the harsher
term "imprisonment" to refer to
adult adjudication. It used the less
harsh term "confinement" to refer to
juvenile adjudication. Id. These
terms were, therefore, intentionally
used to indicate different criminal
dispositions. Id. For Mason's juvenile conviction to count toward
career offender purposes, he must
have received an adult conviction
and an adult sentence. Id.
The court then analyzed
whether Mason was both convicted
and sentenced as an adult for his
juvenile robbery offense. Id. at 560.
.In making a determination, the court
must, according to the rule, examine
the sentencing and conviction guidelines ofthe particular jurisdiction
where the defendant was adjudicated. Id. Mason had been adjudicated in West Virginia. Id.
The court assumed for purposes of its evaluation that Mason
received an adult conviction. Id. A
juvenile convicted under adult
jurisdiction in West Virginia is not
automatically sentenced as an adult.
Id. at 561. Under West Virginia
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code, a circuit court may remand a
minor offender to juvenile jurisdiction after adjudication as an
adult by sentencing the offender as
a juvenile. Id. Mason was sentenced as a juvenile under these
guidelines since the judge sentenced
him to placement in a rehabilitation
center for youthful offenders. Id.
Therefore, the court concluded
Mason was sentenced as ajuvenile.

Id.
Mason's 1981 juvenile sentence meant, therefore, his conviction could not serve as a predicate
felony under Section 4B 1.1. Id. at
562. As such, Mason did not qualify
for career offender status under the
federal sentencing guidelines. Id
As a footnote to its holding,
the Fourth Circuit recognized its
decision was not necessarily
consistent with decisions in other
circuits. Id. at 562. The court's
holding, in this case, may be read
as a liberal interpretation of the
federal sentencing guidelines. The
court did permit a three-time felon
to avoid the strict career offender
classification based on, what some
might read as, a technicality.
However, the Fourth Circuit followed the strictest reading ofthe rule.
Federal sentencing guidelines do not
permit courts to rely on juvenile
felony offenses as predicate offenses
for purposes of career offender sentencing. With its Mason decision,
the Fourth Circuit made a bold
statement. Ifthe Legislature desires
a different interpretation, it must
change the rule accordingly.
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